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TILE FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO
MORTGAGES ON LAND
Lester R. Rusoff*
This article deals with the federal income tax liabilities
incurred -by the owner of mortgaged land and by the holder of
the mortgage in respect to various transactions relating to the
land or the debt. One of the most interesting aspects of the problems arising in this field is the extent to which the debt has been
treated as that of the owner of the land, even though he was not
personally liable for it. The cases following that approach are
often startling at first glance, but appear on further study to be
consistent with the body of tax law.
A related facet of this study is the conflict between the tendency at times to treat a mortgagor as the owner of a physical object and at times to recognize that he has only part of the interests
related to it. The outcome of that conflict seems to depend more
on practical considerations than on jurisprudential distinctions
between things and legal interests. To the extent that the mortgagor is treated as the owner of a physical object, he is considered
as "owing" debts secured by liens upon it.
In this article, the term, "mortgagor", is used to refer to
the owner of land which is subject to a mortgage, whether or not
he is personally liable for the debt. Where his tax liability is
affected by his having assumed or not assumed the debt, that fact
is indicated.
THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE

If a person gives a mortgage on land as security for a loan,
no immediate tax consequences arise for either the borrower or
the lender. Such a transaction has two aspects. First, the mortgagor receives a loan from the mortgagee. Second, he transfers
to the mortgagee an interest in the property used as security.'
Receipt of the loan does not effect realization of taxable income, since the borrower, is legally obliged to repay it.' He ias
increased his assets to the extent of the loan but has also made a
corresponding increase in his liabilities.
Nor does the giving of the mortgage result in taxable gain or
deductible loss for either party. In the older common law, a-mort* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.

1. Brown v. U. S., 95 F. 2d 487, 489 (3d Cir. 1938), reversing 19 F. Siipp. 85
(E. D. Pa. 1937).
2. A contrary result would undoubtedly be- reached-in the case of i sale -di'giird

as a loan.
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gage was considered to be a conveyance of legal title, subject only
to a condition subsequent which gave the mortgagor a power to
re-enter if he paid a certain sum by a stated day.3 So interpreted,
the giving of a mortgage might .beheld to be a sufficient disposition of property for the realization of taxable gain or deductible
loss. The tendency of our courts has been, however, to hold that4
a mortgagee has merely a lien, without any right to possession.
As Judge Learned Hand said in Commissioner v. Crane,5
the mortgagor is the owner for all purposes;

.

.

.

He has all

the income from the property; he manages it; he may sell it;

any increase in its value goes to him; any decrease falls on him
until the value goes below the amount of the lien. The mortgagee is a creditor, and in effect nothing more than a preferred
creditor, even though the mortgagor is not liable for the debt.
For tax purposes too we treat the execution of a mortgage as
the mere giving of security for a loan, not as a disposition of the
property. Therefore, the execution of a mortgage does not give
rise to taxable gain or deductible loss.
A taxpayer has argued that when the owner of property
subjects it to a mortgage securing a loan in an amount greater
than his investment in the property he realizes taxable gain.'
The taxpayer was a corporation which had received the property
in a tax-free exchange and hence had taken over the basis of its
transferor. The issue was the extent of the gain realized by the
taxpayer on a foreclosure sale. The taxpayer argued that, when
its transferor had given a mortgage securing a loan greater than
her investment in-the property, she had realized a taxable gain,
the amount of which should have been added to her basis, thus
increasing the basis of the taxpayer and reducing the amount of
the. gain realized on foreclosure.
The Court of Appeals rejected the taxpayer's argument, however,-on the ground that execution of a mortgage did not constitute
"disposition" of the property under Section 111(a) of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code and hence did not lead to the realization
of taxable gain. Quoting its language in the Crane case, the court
said that the mortgagee is a creditor and the mortgagor remains
the owner of the property.

--.

3.TwFANY, REAL
4:-Id-at 939...

PROPERTY

912 (new abridged ed. 1940).

5. 153 F. 2d 504, 506, (2d Cir. 1945).
6. Woodsam. Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T. C. 649 (1951), aff'd, 198
F. 2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). An attorney for the taxpayer in that case has disquss'cd -the
-economic, practical, and legal arguments for the taxpayer's position. Note, 6 TAx L.
REv. 319 (1951).
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THE PARTY ENTrILED TO DEDUCT DEPRECIATION

Since the mortgagor remains substantially the owner of the
mortgaged property, he is ordinarily the person entitled to deduct
depreciation on it. The general principle is that the person who
will bear the economic loss resulting from the physical deterioration of the property may take the deduction. 7 Usually the mortgagor bears that economic loss, because the value of the mortgaged
property exceeds the amount of the debt. Normally, he will repay
the debt and own the property unencumbered."
In Crane v. Commissioner, however, the taxpayer, who had
inherited mortgaged property and had not assumed the debt,
argued that she had not borne the economic loss occasioned by
depreciation.9 The value of the property had been reported for
estate tax purposes as equal to the total of the principal of the
debt and the interest in default. The taxpayer had used that value
a's her basis for calculating deductions for depreciation. 10 She
later sold the property and received a small amoint of cash. . The
Commissioner contended that she had realized a gain, computed
by adding the amount of the debt to the net cash received by the
7. The basis of the assets of a public utility company has been reduced to eliminate
amounts which its customers had paid toward the erection of its facilities. Detroit
Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 98 (1943). The Court said in respect to depreciation:
"The end and purpose of it all is to approximate and reflect the financial consequences to the taxpayer of the subtle effects of time and use on the value of his
capital assets. For this purpose it is sound accounting practice annually to accrue
as to each classification of depreciable property an amount which at the time it is
retired will with its salvage value replace the original investment therein." [Italics
added.]
Contrast Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U. S. 583 (1950), where the
taxpayer was allowed to depreciate buildings given to encourage it to conduct manufacturing operations in particular towns and to depreciate the full cost of property
purchased with contributions made by local people for such purposes. The Supreme
Court there held that the amounts received had been contributions to capital; it
distinguished Detroit Edison Co., as involving payments -made by customers for services.
339 U. S. 583, 591 (1950). Section 362(c) of the 1954 Code now provides in effect,
that property contributed to a corporation, not by a shareholder as such, or prop'erty acquired for money so contributed shall have a basis of zero. Congress thus
has denied any deduction for depreciation of such property. A transaction purporting to effect a transfer in trust with a lease back to the transferor was construed
as a loan on the security of the property transferred; depreciation deductions were
allowed to the transferor. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S.252 (1939).
The owner. of condemned property has been denied the right to deduct depreciation for
the period between the condemnation judgment and the transfer of possession. Edith
Henry Barbour, 44 B. T. A. 1117 (1941), reversed on other grounds, 136 F. 2d 486
(6th Cir. 1943).
8.Note, 13 U. CHL L. Rsv: 510, 518 (1946).
9. 331 U. S.1, 11 (1947).
10. Apparently the taxpayer received little tax benefit from those deductions but
did not argue that point in the Supreile Court. According to a Note, 49 COL. L. Rv.
845,'848 n. 24, (1949), the taxpayer realized a tax'benefit of roughly $150 from the
ep'reciation deductions lbut 'had to pay a tax, on dispasitiori' of the property, of about
$1900.
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taxpayer and subtracting therefrom the basis of the taxpayer,
which he determined to be the value at which the property had
been returned for estate tax purposes, minus the depreciation
which the taxpayer had deducted. The taxpayer argued that she
should calculate her taxable gain by subtracting a basis of zero,
the value of her equity, from the amount of the net cash received.
The Commissioner argued that using the value of an equity as a
basis for depreciation was impractical. The taxpayer replied that
the problem of depreciation was irrelevant, because her equity had
no value and consequently not she but the mortgagee bore the
economic loss resulting from depreciation and should have been
allowed the deductions. In support of the taxpayer's position, it
could be argued that generally depreciation is allowed only to
replace the actual investment of the taxpayer, not to recover the
value of the physical object." The difficulties with the taxpayer's
position were first, that depreciation had in fact been "allowed"
to her and, second, that she had not proved that the value of the
property was less than the amount of the mortgage.12 The Supreme Court adopted the view of the Commissioner as to the
taxpayer's basis. It did not directly decide that the taxpayer
had been entitled to deduct depreciation, but such a conclusion
probably follows from the decision that was made.
Normally, no one will make a loan on property worth less
than the amount of the loan. If, however, the value of the property drops below the amount of the debt, does the right to deduct
depreciation shift to the mortgagee? This problem may not be
important if in fact mortgagors usually suffer foreclosure or
transfer their interests to the mortgagees when the value of the
property falls below the amount of the debt.'3 Perhaps, however,
during times of depression mortgagees prefer to let mortgagors
retain possession if they will at least make some payments of
interest rather than foreclose and be burdened with management
of the property. That appears to have been for some years the
situation involved in Crane v. Commissioner. Even if the mortgagor does default and suffer foreclosure relatively soon after the
decline of the value of the property below the amount of the debt,
a problem may arise as to the person entitled to deduct deprecia11. 21 So. CALIF. L. REv. 112, 113 (1947).

See also note 7, supra.
12. As executrix of the estate of her husband, the taxpayer claimed deductions for
depreciation for the estate for the years 1932 through 1936; she claimed such deductions
in her own returns for 1937 and 1938. 3 T. C. 585, 587 (1944). The Supreme Court
apparently assumed that the taxpayer had claimed the deductions in her individual
returns for the years 1932 through 1938. 331 U. S. 1, 3, n. 2, 15 (1947). The matter
may be inconsequential, since the taxpayer was the sole beneficiary of her husband's
estate.

13. Note, 13 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 510, 515, n. 25, 517, n. 31, 518 (1946).
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tion for the period between that decline and the foreclosure sale.
There appear, however, to be no decisions permitting a mortgagee
to deduct depreciation on the mortgaged property, and the
Supreme Court, in the Crane case, indicated that a mortgagee
could not deduct depreciation while the mortgagor was in possesallowed only as to property
sion, since the deduction was then
"used in the trade or business."114
If the mortgagor is solvent and personally liable on the debt
he should be able to deduct depreciation regardless of the relative
amounts of the debt and the value of the property, since further
decline in value of the property may increase his liability on a
deficiency judgment. Even in other cases, shifting the right to
the
deduction may be undesirable because of the difficulty of determining
the fair market value of property. Such value may have
to be determined as of the time of the foreclosure sale so that the
mortgagee's gain or loss can be ascertained;' 5 but shifting the
right to deduct depreciation would require determining just when
the fair market value of the property fell below the amount of the
debt. That burden would overbalance the theoretical advantage
of shifting the deduction to the party who will bear the loss. See
the more feasible suggestion, discussed below, that the mortgagor
deduct depreciation until he has exhausted a basis equal to his
original equity and that no further depreciation be allowed to
either party, with any loss suffered by the mortgagee being deductible as a bad debt.
THE MORTGAGOR'S BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF DEPRECIATION
Since the mortgagor normally may deduct depreciation on
the property, what is his basis? If he owned the property before he executed the mortgage, he continues to use his original
basis. If, when he bought the property, he gave a purchase money
mortgage to secure his obligation to pay part of the price and became personally liable for the debt, he uses the total price as his
basis.

A more difficult problem arises if the mortgagor is not personally liable for the debt. The leading case dealing with that
problem is Crane v. Commissioner,6 which held that a taxpayer
14. 331 U. S. 1, 10, n. 28 (1947). INT. REv.
amendment by § 121(c) of the 1942 Revenue Act.

§23(1) (1939), prior to its
The addition of the phrase, "of

CODE

property held for the production of income", probably did not change the result, if
property" means "physical property", since the "property" would then seem to be

"held" by the mortgagor. Query as to whether this line of argument can be squared
with the cases, such as Terminal Really Corporation, 32 B. T. A. 623 (1935), which

have allowed a lessor to deduct depreciation in respect to leased property.
15. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-3 (1953).
16. 331 U, S. 1 (1947).
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who had inherited property from her husband subject to a mortgage should use as her basis for depreciation the fair market value
of the physical property as of the time of his death, undiminished
by the debt. The Court based its conclusion on long-established
administrative interpretation and practice, on the interpretation
of the word, "property", in Section 113(a) (6) of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code, 17 as referring to a physical thing rather than to a
particular legal interest in a thing, and on the impracticality of
computing depreciation deductions on the basis of changing equities.
Under Crane v.. Commissioner, what is the effect on the mortgagor's basis of payments by him on the principal amount of the
debt? That problem was later dealt with in Parker v. Delaney. 8
The taxpayer had acquired property subject to liens totallirng
$273,000. While he owned the property, he paid $13,989.38 on the
mortgages and deducted depreciation of $45,280.489 . The ta.payer then transferred -the property to then6 Otggebs. "'Thb irst
Circuit held that he realized taxable gain in the amount...of
$31,291.10. That amounit apparently was computed ag followg:

.....

.Unadjusted basis ........
Less depreciation .........
Adjusted basis ..........

$273',000.00
45,280.48
:$227,719.52

Original debt .............
273,000.00
Less payments ............
13,989.38
Amount realized ..... I.... $259,010.62
Amount realized ..........
259,010.62
Less adjusted basis.
.
227,719.52
Gain .............
..... $ 31,291.10
The payments on the ddebt then had'n'n6 'ffect "on te taxayer's
basis. It would seem at first thought that such payments should be
added to the taxpayer's basis, but the effect would be to permit
depreciation on an amount "exceeding the fair market value and
heilce the deduction would b6 without relation to the Physicail
exhaustion of the property. -That-alone might not-be fatal, since
depreciation of property does not necessarily correspond to the
economic loss caused by phygica:l deteribration. The basis of tlh'
.17. Now' § 1014(a) of the 1954 Code.

.-

18. 186 F. 2d. 455, .457, 6. 2.(lstCir. 1950).
"
19. Legal title "was held by a st rawman 'f6r''the taxpayer, but that fact may be
ignored for present purposes.

.

"

FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
property may be considerably different from its fair market value,
because the price paid, in the case of purchased property, may be
different from the market value and because the market value of
the property may fluctuate after its acquisition. A second effect,
however, would be to give the taxpayer an undeserved loss on
disposition of the property. Assuming that the amount of the
debt, reduced by the payments, would be includible in the amount
realized by the taxpayer,2 0 he would recover such payments twice,
once through their addition to his basis and the second time
through their deduction from the -amount realized. Thus, it seems
preferable to ignore such payments in determining the mortgagor's basis. An alternative approach would be to add the
payments but subtract the corresponding reduction of the debt;
that approach offers no substantial advantage.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Magruder proposed another
approach. Noting the strain exerted on Section 111(b) of the
1939 Code by inclusion of the amount of an unassumed debt in the
"amount realized", he suggested that the original out-of-pocket
cost of the taxpayer, zero, be taken as his unadjusted basis, that
payments on the debt be added to that basis, and that depreciation
that had been allowed be subtracted from it. The adjusted basis
at the time of disposition of the mortgagor's interest would then
be negative. The "amount realized" would be only the amount of
cash received, zero. The gain so computed would be the same as
that -arrived at by the majority.
Judge Magruder's approach had the theoretical advantage
of permitting a less strained construction of the phrase, "amount
realized", and using it retroactively in Parker v. Delaney would
have done no harm, since the result would have been the same.
Used prospectively, however, it would add complexity to the calculation of deductions for depreciation without preventing the tax
avoidance and hardship which may result from the Crane case.
A question can also be raised as to whether the Crane case
would have reached a different decision as to the taxpayer's basis
if it had been proved that the estate from which she had received
the property had not been liable for the amount of the debt. Section 81.38 of lRegs. 105 provides that in such an event only the value
of the equity need be included in the gross estate. Would that
have affected the basis calculated under Section 113(a) (5) of the
1939 Code? Probably there should be no difference since the practical result, for estate tax purposes, of including the fair market
20. See the discussion below under the heading, Transfer to a Third Party
of the
Interest of the Mortgagee or Mortgagor, and under subsequent headings.
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value of the physical object and deducting the amount of the debt
is the same as that of including only the value of the equity. Section 81.38 does, however, show that the word "property" has
sometimes been interpreted to mean "equity" and that consequently such an interpretation of "property" in Sections 111 and
113 (a) (5) of the 1939 Code was not necessarily excluded. 21
The Crane case dealt with a taxpayer who had received the
property in question by devise. There is also authority which
supports the position that one who buys property subject to a
mortgage but without assuming liability thereunder may include
the amount of the mortgage in his basis. In Parker v. Delaney,
discussed above, the parties apparently agreed upon such treatment of a mortgage. Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Commissiozer so
held as to tax liens.2 2 The Tax Court there relied chiefly on Crane
v. Commissioner.
The position of the Crane case need not have been carried over
to the case of a taxpayer who purchased property subject to liens,
as in Blackstone Theatre Co. The decision in Crane was based at
least partly on the fact that it dealt with inherited property, subject to Section 113(a) (5) of the 1939 Code. There the problem was
the meaning of the word "property". The Regulations seemed
to require that the word be interpreted to refer to the physical object and that its value be taken as the fair market value returned
for estate tax purposes, undiminished by liens.23 Here, however,
Section 113 (a) of the 1939 Code was applicable, and the question,
at least in part, was the meaning of "cost". 2" Exclusion of the
debt from "cost" for this purpose would have been consistent with
the cases on cancellation of indebtedness, which have found that
the owner of mortgaged property not personally liable for the
2
debt did not realize taxable incomeY.
The result here does show
the increasing tendency of the courts to treat an unassumed debt
as a liability of the owner of the security.
THE MORTGAGOR'S BASIS

AS AFFECTED BY REDUCTION OF THE DEBT

Reduction of a debt often results in the realization of taxable
income by the debtor.26 Such tax treatment may be harsh, however, because the transaction does not give the debtor any cash
21. Note, 21 So. CALIF. L. REv. 112, 115-116 (1947).
22. 12 T. C. 801 (1949).
23. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 113(a) (5)-1(c) (1938); U. S. Treas. Reg. 105,
§81.10 (1944); U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.38 (1942).
24. The same question is raised under Section 1012 of the 1954 Code.
25. See below at page 192.
26. INT. REv. CODE § 61(a) (12)

(1931).

(1954).

U. S. v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1
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with which to pay the tax. Consequently, judicial and legislative
devices for avoiding that hardship have been evolved. The courts
have sometimes interpreted the transaction as a reduction of the
purchase price of property held by the debtor. His basis for such
property has then been reduced, thus,
in effect, delaying any tax
27
until the disposition of the property.
The real difficulty has been determining whether the transaction should be treated as a reduction of the purchase price of the
mortgaged property. Except where special facts were present, a
mortgagee's settlement of the debt or part of it for less than the
face amount has been treated not as such a reduction but as a realization of taxable income. 28 That was the usual result where the
mortgagor repurchased its bonds at a discount.2 9 That result could
be avoided if the mortgagor could prove that he dealt with the
mortgagee in terms of reduction of the purchase price, as where
the value of the property had fallen and the debt was settled for
an amount not less than the then value of the property. This
doctrine is consistent with the usual principle that no taxable income is realized on the purchase of property." It may conflict,
however, with the rule that tax liability is computed on the basis of
annual accounting periods2 The doctrine has, in fact, been rejected in part on that ground 2 by cases which tend to limit the
purchase price doctrine to cases in which the debt was incurred
and reduced in the same year.3 The purchase price doctrine has
27. For a full analysis of this problem under the 1939 Code, see L. Hart Wright,
Realization of Income Through Cancellations, Modifications, and. Bargain Purchases
of Indebtedness: II, 49 MICH. L. REv. 667, 674-684 (1951).
28. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28 (1949) ; Helvering v. American
Chicle Co., 291 U. S. 426 (1934); Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp.,
71 F. 2d 104 (1st Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934) ; Frank v. U. S., 44
F. Supp. 729 (E. D. Pa. 1942) ; aff'd, 131 F. 2d 864 (3d Cir. 1942); Marion A. Blake,
8 T. C. 546 (1947) ; L. D. Coddon & Bros., 37 B. T. A. 393 (1938); Consolidated Gas
Co. of the City of Pittsburgh, 24 B. T. A. 901 (1931).
29. Helvering v. A. L. Killian Co., 128 F. 2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942), a.#irming 44
B. T. A. 169 (1941) ; Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F. 2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940), reversing
41 B. T. A. 890 (1940). In the Hirsch case, the court based its decision on the ground
that a loss in value of the property offset any income realized from the reduction of
indebtedness. On its facts, however, the case seems to fall with those relying on the
doctrine of reduction in purchase price. Hextell v. Huston, 28 F. Supp. 521 (D. Iowa
1939), appeal dismissed without opinion, 107 F. 2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Gehring Publishing Co., Inc., et al., 1 T. C. 345 (1942) ; Ralph W. Gwinn, P-H 1944 T. C. Mem.
Dec. Par. 44,208; Mark W. Allen & Co., P-H 1943 T. C. Mem. Dec. Par. 43, 168.
30. Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 63, 69 (1937). Exception has been made to
that principle in the case of bargain purchases by employees. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.22(a)-1 (1953). See also Int. Rev. Code § 421 (1954), on employee stock options.
31. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 363 (1931).
32. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. 2d 104, 106 (1st Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934) ; L. D. Coddon & Bros., Inc., 37 B. T. A. 393,
397-8 (1938) ; B. F. Avery & Sons, Inc., 26 B. T. A. 1393, 1399-1400 (1932).
33. Des Moines Improvement Co., 7 B. T. A. 279 (1927).
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been criticized on several other grounds.3 4 It ignores the fact that
reduction of the debt to an amount not exceeding the value of the
security frees other assets of the mortgagor from liability to be
taken in satisfaction of the debt. Such freeing of assets from an
offset by a debt was the basis of the decision in U. S. v. Kirby Lumber Co., the leading case holding that taxable income resulted from
cancellation of indebtedness25 The purchase price doctrine tends
to cause administrative inconvenience since the reduction of basis
should lead to re-computation of depreciation on returns previously filed and still open to adjustment. It has also been argued
that the doctrine would delay final determination of gain or loss
on the sale of mortgaged property subject to a mortgage until settlement of the debt. This seems to be wrong since a settlement
of the debt which led to a reduction of the basis of the mortgagor
would result in a similar reduction of the amount realized by him.
The purchase price doctrine has also been criticized on the
ground that it involves a recognition of a loss in respect to property which the taxpayer still owns.36 Some cases have been decided in part upon that ground 7 It is submitted, however, that
that argument is not conclusive. The taxpayer in such a case is
not attempting to deduct a loss from income received from other
transactions. He seeks merely to avoid being treated as having
realized a taxable gain at the time of the settlement of the debt.
If no such gain is realized, the taxpayer's basis will be reduced,
so that if he sells the property during a later inflationary period,
he may realize a gain at that time.
In effect, Congress appears to have adopted and extended the
purchase price doctrine. Under Sections 22(b) (9) and 113(b) (3)
of the 1939 Code, a corporation which realized income through the
discharge of indebtedness evidence by a security might elect to
exclude that income and instead to reduce the basis of its assets.
The 1954 Code has 'broadened that privilege. Under Sections
108(a) and 1017, either a corporation or an individual has such an
election, if in the case of the individual the indebtedness was
incurred or assumed in connection with property used in his trade
or business. Also, the debt need not have been evidenced by a
security.
The purchase price doctrine developed by the courts relates
only to a debt incurred in connection with the acquisition of spe34. Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1072 (1941).
35. 284 U. S. 1 (1931).
36. Snee, A Statutory Approach to the Tax Problems of the Mortgagor Cousequent
upon Reduction of the Mortgage Debt, 21 FORDHAm L. Rxv. 42, 47 (1952)
37. Co,nmissioner v. Coastuse Transportation Corp., 71 F. 2d 104 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934); L. D. Coddon & Bros., Inc., 37 B. T. A. 393 (1938).
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cific property. Sections 108(a) and 1017 seem to apply not only
to such debts but also to debts incurred subsequently to the
purchase of the property given as security and to debts not secured by any specific property of the taxpayer. This result is
clear in the case of corporate debtors. It is less certain in the case
of individuals. The statute refers to a debt "incurred or assumed
in connection with property used in his trade or business."
The Senate Committee Report, however, states that the provision
is applicable "to the indebtedness of an individual if the indebtedness was incurred or assumed by the individual in connection with
the acquisition of property used in his trade or business." 3 The
words "the acquisition of" do not appear in the statute. Do they
nevertheless constitute a limitation on the applicability of the
statute?
Whether the election is permitted in respect to debts secured
by previously acquired property seems to depend on the answers
to the following questions:
1. Does the language of Section 108(a) clearly bar the election? Are such debts incurred or assumed in connection with the
property? The connection is not so great as in the case of a purchase-money debt, but is it sufficient for the purpose of Section

108(a)?
2. If Section 108(a) does not clearly bar the election, is it ambiguous, so that a committee report may be used to determine its
meaning?
3. If Section 108(a) taken literally clearly does permit the election, may a committee report be used to limit the applicability of
that section?
4. Did the Committee in fact mean to limit the application of
Section 108(a) to purchase-money debts or merely to state an instance in which the statute does apply?
The writer submits that Section 108(a) should be interpreted
to permit the election as to debts secured by previously acquired
property. The ground for this position is that Section 108(a)
does not clearly bar the election, and that even if it does not clearly permit it, the Committee Report does not show an intention of
Congress to limit the election to the case of a purchase-money
debt. Had Congress intended such a limitation, it could easily
have inserted the words "the acquisition of" into the statute.
Furthermore, there seems to be no reason to place such a limitation upon an individual when it does not apply to a corporation.
38.

SEN. REP.

No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1954).

191
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Probably the purpose of the limiting language in clause (1) (B)
of Section 108(a) is merely to bar the use of the election in respect to non-business debts which would generally not be incurred
by a corporation.
Thus it appears that the effect of Section 108(a) and 1017
is broader than that of the purchase-price doctrine, in that those
sections permit the reduction of the basis of property not purchased in connection with the incurrence of the debt. Also those
sections confer an election, thus giving the taxpayer a greater
choice than the judicial decisions could.
Before the adoption of the 1954 Code the owner of property
subject to a mortgage could also avoid a finding that a reduction
of the debt constituted a realization of taxable income if he was
not personally liable on the debt.-" Note, however, the discussion
of Lutz & Schramm Co., below. The tendency to treat a secured
debt as the debt of the owner of the security even though he has
not assumed the debt may lead to a change in this rule. We have
already seen that pre-existing liens have been treated as part of
the "cost" of one who purchased property without assuming the
debts secured thereby.40
It is arguable that the exception of the taxpayer who was not
personally liable on the debt has been abrogated by the 1954 Code.
Section 108(a) extends the privilege of excluding income realized
by the discharge of indebtedness not only to a taxpayer who was
personally liable for the debt but also to a taxpayer who merely
took property subject to a debt. This seems to be the effect of
Section 108(a), despite some ambiguity which appears in Section
108(a) (1) because of the use of the phrase, "incurred or assumproperty
ed". Was a debt "incurred" by a taxpayer who bouht
41
subject to it? Probably Congress meant that it was.
There seems to be no reason to state expressly that a taxpayer
who merely takes subject to a debt may exercise the election
granted by Section 108 unless in the absence of that provision he
would realize gross income. Such a result will not damage a
taxpayer who may exercise the election granted by Section 108,
since he would normally reduce the basis of his property in this
39. Ernst Kern Co., 1 T. C. 249 (1942), appeal dismissed (6th Cir. 1944) ; P. J.
Hiatt, 35 B. T. A. 292 (1937) ; Fdton Gold Corp., 31 B. T. A. 519 (1934) ; Aincrican
Seating Co., 14 B. T. A. 328 (1928), modified without discussion of this point, 50 F.
2d 681 (7th Cir. 1931).
40. Blackstone Theatre Co., 12 T. C. 801 (1949).
41. It may be noted also that Section 108(a) does not indicate whether the taxpayer must be the corporation or the individual who incurred or assumed the debt within
Section 108(a) (1). Congress probably meant that he must.
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situation, but it will work to the detriment of a taxpayer who does
not have that privilege because of the limitations stated in Section
108(a) (1) (B).
Probably the mortgagor would not be considered to have realized taxable income but to have reduced his basis for the mortgaged property if he was insolvent before and after the reduction
of the debt. It has been held that no income is realized in such
a situation.4 2 That result has been criticized on the ground that
it is inconsistent with the treatment of other types of income, such
as dividends or interest, as taxable to an insolvent taxpayer. 43
The reason for the result seems to be the converse of the notion
of Kirby Lumber Co.: that a taxpayer realizes taxable income
on the cancellation of indebtedness because it frees his assets from
the liability. No such freedom is gained by the taxpayer who
remains insolvent.
Similar results have also been reached in less common situations: where the debtor and creditor reduced the contemplated
amount of the debt before the transaction giving rise to it was
complete ;44 where the original agreement contemplated a reduction of the debt if paid in cash ;45 or where the mortgagor paid
the debt with certificates of the mortgagee purchased at a discount, pursuant to the terms of the original agreement."
PAYMENTS OF INTEREST BY THE MORTGAGOR

The treatment of such payments reflects the tendency to treat
the owner of an equity as liable on the debt, even though it could
not be enforced against his other assets. If the mortgagor is
personally liable on the debt, he can of course deduct payments
of interest. 47 This is the case even if the equity has since been
transferred to a third party.48 Although not personally liable
on the debt, he can deduct payments of interest.4 9 This is an exception to the general rule that one may deduct interest payments
only on his own debts.50 The explanation can only be our tendency
to treat the owner of the equity as liable on the debt regardless of
whether he has assumed it.
42. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co., v. Commissioner, 70 F. 2d 95
(5th Cir. 1934).
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44. Des Moines Improvement Co., 7 B. T. A. 279 (1927).
45. Pinckney Packing Co., 42 B. T. A. 823 (1940).
46. Cherokee Co., 41 B. T. A. 1212 (1940).
47. Int. Rev. Code § 163 (a) (1954).
48. Edward C. Kohlsaat, 40 B.-T. A. 528 (1939); Robert C. Ligget, P-H 1945
TC Mem. Dec. Par. 45, 200.
49. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(b) (1953).
50. Colston v. Burnet, 59 F. 2d 867 (D. C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 640

(1932).
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Interest on a mortgage debt is, of course, includible in the
gross income of the mortgagee.-' The time of inclusion depends
on the time of payment and on whether the mortgagee uses the
cash or accrual system of accounting.5 2 The problem of whether
a mortgagee should be treated as having received interest on
foreclosure of a mortgage will be dealt with below.
TRANSFER TO A THRD PARTY OF THE INTEREST OF THE
MORTGAGEE OR MORTGAGOR

Our most interesting questions lie in this area, the field of
the leading and controversial Crane case.
The tax consequences of a transfer of the interest of the mortgagee are relatively easy to develop. If he sells his interest at a
loss, he has a deduction under Section 165. If the mortgage and
the debt constituted a capital asset in his hands, his treatment of
the loss will be subject to the limitations of Sections 1211 and
1212.25 Similarly, any gain will be includible in gross income
under Section 61, subject to the provisions relating to capital gains
and losses.
The problems relating to a mortgagor's disposition of his
interest are more difficult. The easiest situation to dispose of is
that in which the mortgagor was personally liable for the debt and
sold his equity to a purchaser who assumed liability for the debt.
In that case, the amount of the mortgage is property other than
money received by the mortgagor and hence is part of the amount
realized by him. That follows because the promise 54of the purchaser to pay the debt is an asset of the mortgagor.
The more difficult rule to -accept is that applicable to the
mortgagor who was not personally liable for the debt: the amount
of the debt is still treated as part of the amount realized." The
difficulty lies in seeing how in such a case the seller can be said
to have received anything in respect of the mortgage. The result,
though, is probably sound being compelled by the holding discussed
above, that the basis of property acquired subject to a mortgage,
but without its assumption, includes the amount of the mortgage.
The result of excluding the debt from the amount realized
would have been undesirable. Justice Vinson said that it would
51. INT. REV. CODE § 61(a)(4) (1954).
52. INT. REv. CODE §§ 441, 446, and 451
53. INT. REV. CODE § 165(f) (1954).

(1954).

54. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-18 (1953).
55. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1 (1947). Regulation 118 § 39.44-2(c) treated
the amount of the debt as part of the selling price, for the purposes of Section 44 of
the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, which dealt with installment sales. On that matter
see also Fritz L. Braunfeld, Subject to a Mortgage, 24 TAXES 424, 434 (1946).
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have meant, in effect, giving the taxpayer a double deduction for
5
depreciation.2
In what sense is that true? A contrary holding
would have given the taxpayer a deductible loss to the extent of
the difference between her adjusted basis and the amount of cash,
realized.5 7 Such a result would have been undesirable since the
taxpayer had not invested anything in the property and had-never.
had a substantial equity in-it. That result would not,--however, by
itself have involved a double deduction of depreciation, since the
amount of the loss would have been determined by reference -to
adjusted basis, taking into account the depreciation which- -thetaxpayer had deducted.
Justice Vinson assumed, however, that since the taxpayer
received some cash the property must have been -worth the amount.
of the debt plus the cash. He thought that the taxpayer's position
then, in becoming free of the debt-ridden property was the same
as if she had received the cash.'plus other money in the -amount
of the debt, subject to aif obligtiofi-to use that otheif- n6nyto
pay the debt. Had that occurred she would have re~eiWd dash
totalling more than her adjusted basis so that she -would not only
have realized no loss .but also would have realized a gain to the
extent that her adjusted basis was exceeded, to the ektefit that
she had deducted depreciation. Compared with such a result, the
result of a holding that the amount realized did not include theamount of the debt thus would have been an allowance to the
taxpayer of a double deduction for depreciation. Since the t=:tx
payer had deducted depreciation from a basis*which represfit~d:
iieither any outlay-by her nor the actual value of her interest inthe property, "it
was desirable that she be treated as having realC
ized a taxable gain to compensate the government for the ta:kes
lost through that deduction. That result was achieved by holding
that the debt was included in the amount realized.
The'government does not recover, through the result in Cranev. Cor;uissioiie, predsely the7 amount of taxes saved -by a-mi6rt-.
gagor through the allowance of deductions f6r dpr eiation.-The
deductions are allowed fAgainst -0rdinaryineome-whereas .the-gain
on the sale is capital. Thus the:.Crane decision as to.hasis affdrds:
a-simplemethod of.tax-avoidanie-for taxpayers in high brackes 5 That assumes that the Crane rule, which includes the amount of
the debt in the mortgagor 's basis, is applied to purchasers as well
56. 331 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
57. Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 845, 847 n. 19 (1949). The taxpayer did not contend
for .such a.result but argued tht.her unadjusted basis was only the value of her equityand that shhJa& rea.ljzed only the net cash. which sbgbad.received.'58. Note, 49 COL. L. Rv. 845, 849 (1949) ; Note, 21 So. CALm L. REv. 112,_113"
(1947) ; Note, 33 IovA L. REv.-143, .147 n.26 (1947),
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as to devisees and heirs, or that thoughtful fathers will buy heavily
mortgaged property to be inherited by their wealthy children.
The Tax Court has applied the Crane rule to purchasers."
On the other hand the government may on the sale more than
recover the taxes lost through depreciation deductions. That will
be the case if the mortgagor had so little income that his effective
rate of tax in the years before the sale was less than the rate
applicable to capital gains or if he had insufficient income to benefit from the whole of the deductions.6 0 The basis of a taxpayer
who is entitled to deduct depreciation is reduced in the amount
of the depreciation deduction taken, even though that deduction
does not give him any tax benefit, to the extent that the deduction
is allowable. 6162 The Crane case itself involved such a hardship for
the taxpayer.
To end these possibilities of tax avoidance by some taxpayers
and hardship to others, the suggestion has been made that if the
owner of property subject to a mortgage is not personally liable
on the debt, the debt should be included in his basis for the purpose of computing the amount of his deductions for depreciation,
but excluded from the basis from which those amounts are deducted as well as from the amount realized on the sale of the
property. The amount of the deduction then would be calculated
as a percentage of the sum of the equity and the debt, but the
deduction would be applied against only the equity. 3 After adjustment of the equity to zero no further depreciation deductions
would be allowed. 64 The equity would, of course, include not merely the original investment of the mortgagor but also any payments
by him of the debt.6 5
Limiting depreciation to the book equity would cause no hardship to the mortgagor since only the property concerned is liable
for the debt. The real loss would fall on the mortgagee who would
be permitted a deduction of a loss or a bad debt on foreclosure or
settlement with the mortgagor.
Such procedure would prevent both the tax avoidance and the
hardship made possible by the Crane case. The taxpayer in the
59. Blackstone Theatre Co., 12 T. C. 801 (1949).
60. Note, 49 COL. L. Ra,. 845, 849-50 (1949).
61. INT. Rav. CODE § 1016(a)(2) (1954).

62. Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 845, 848 n. 24 (1949).
63. Note, 49 COL. L. Ray. 845, 851 (1949).
64. An alternative suggestion is that the basis and the amount realized should
include the amount of the idebt but that depreciation should be allowed only to the extent

of the book equity; the result would be the same. Note, 13 U. Cia. L. REv. 510, 514
!
(1946).,
65. Cf. Comment, 26 TEx. L.-Rv. 796, 799 (1948).
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high brackets would not get depreciation deductions calculated on
and deducted from a basis exceeding his actual investment. The
taxpayer in a low bracket would not need to be charged with the
realization of the debt on disposition of the property merely to
balance depreciation deductions which he did not need and. to
prevent him from deducting a loss which did not represent an
investment by him.
Would the treatment just described involve difficulties if the
mortgagor's equity fluctuated? Fluctuations due to increases in
the market value of the realty should be disregarded for purposes
of depreciation, as they generally are. Here we sacrifice economic
theory for administrative convenience. 66 Such fluctuations would
simply result in the realization of gain on disposition of the property if, for example, a third party paid a substantial sum for it.
A more difficult problem is that of an increase in the equity or the
re-creation of an equity through payments of principal by the
mortgagor. As a practical matter a mortgagor not personally
liable may rarely make payments of principal on a debt which is
greater than the fair market value of the mortgaged property.
If he did make such payments, they could be added to his adjusted
basis and depreciation allowed until their exhaustion. Some additional computation by the taxpayer and the revenue officials would
be required, but no problem of guessing at fair market value would
arise. Thus the difficulties that might arise from fluctuation of
the equity seem soluble.
The adoption of a rule providing for the deduction of depreciation only to the extent of the mortgagor's book equity, and for
the exclusion of the amount of the debt from the "amount realized" could best be effected through legislation. The course of
decision now shows a tendency to apply generally the rules
of
Crane v. Commissioner as to basis and amount realized.6 It
seems doubtful that that tendency will be reversed; and complete
settlement of the matter by the Supreme Court may 'be long delayed. 8
Assuming, however, that the result .of the Crane case is
allowed to stand, what is a satisfactory rationalization for. it?
The difficulty arises partly from the ambiguity of the word
"property". In determining the taxpayer's basis the court interpreted that word to mean the physical thing, not the taxpayer's
interest in it. Then in ascertaining the amount realized the court
66. Note, 13 U. Cm. L. REv. 510, 515, n. 25 (1946).

67. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F. 2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950); Blackstone Theatre Co.,
12 T. C. 801 (1949).

68. For specific suggestions as to the sections of the Internal Revenue Code to bVe

ametrded, sue Note, 33 IoWA L. REv. 143, 149-150 (1947).
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asserted that she must have sold the same "property", that no
one sells a "property" worth several hundred thousand dollars
for a few thousand, and that, therefore, she must have received
the amount of the mortgage debt. The difficulty is that the taxpayer never had nor disposed of the totality of interests in the
physical thing. Admittedly, it is not correct to treat the taxpayer's interest as only the excess of the value of the property
over the amount of the debt."' In addition to that interest she
had the right to possession of 'the property and to the income from
it so that she was more like an "owner" of "the property" than
anyone else. Yet she never had, nor disposed, of the totality of
interests in the physical thing. *The answer seems to be that
having abused the word "pioperty" to arrive at a practicable
basis for depreciation we kick it again to avoid giving the taxpayer undeserved deductions of depreciation and a loss.
There has been some discussion of the significance of the re:ceipt of cash.by the taxpayer in the Crane case. The court used
that fact as a basis for arguing that the property was worth more
than the amount of the debt, that the taxpayer before the sale had
.to treat the debt as its own, and that therefore, the sale of the property subject to the debt amounted to a release of the taxpayer from
a debt. The difficulty with that argument is that the. purchaser
may have paid that cash merely for the privileges of receiving
income from the property until foreclosure and of negotiating
with the mortgagee for a reduction in the debt.7 0 Hence the equity
may have had some market value, but not such value as to cause
the taxpayer to pay principal or interest from her other funds.
It does not follow, then, that the taxpayer was under serious
economic pressure to treat the debt as her own while she owned
the equity.
This discussion of the effect of the receipt of cash for the
equity leads to the question of what result would occur if no cash
.wre received, especially if there -were evidence that t he..pr6perty
was worth less than the am6unt of the debt, or if cash were. received but the sum of that cash and the value of the property ,%as
less than the amount of the debt. In the latter case, should the
"amount realized" be limited to that sum? Such a limitation
would lessen the hardship to the taxpayer who has to pay a tax
on -his gain without having received anything with which to pay
it except the small amount of cash. For the goverfiment such a
-limitation would be better than a rule that only the cash was
realized since the taxpayer would not realize so great an undeserved loss deduction.
'
69: As.seems to be impli.
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If the problem arises often enough to be important it might
be dealt with by amending Section 1001(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code to include a provision like the following:
"The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of
property subject to an indebtedness for which the taxpayer shall
not have been personally liable shall be the sum of any money
received, plus the fair market value of any property (other than
money) received, plus either the amount of the debt or the fair
market value of the property sold or disposed of, whichever shall
be less. For the purpose of this subsection, the amount of the
debt secured by the property shall not be considered property
received by the taxpayer."
Such a statute would effect a compromise between the result of
Crane v. Commissioner as to the amount realized and the result
which would have followed from a contrary decision. If the property had been worth the amount of the debt when it was acquired
by the taxpayer and if the decline in value had been due to physical deterioration, the statute should prevent the taxpayer from
realizing any substantial gain that would result from including the
full debt in the amount realized or the loss that would result from
excluding the debt entirely. Thus the taxpayer would avoid the
hardship of the Crane rule, without getting the "free" loss deduction which a contrary conclusion in the Crane case would have
permitted.
Could such a statute be justified theoretically? It would be
met with the objection which is available against the Crane case
itself: the taxpayer has not in fact received anything. Also, taxable gain is usually measured by the value of what the taxpayer
has received, not by the value of what he has given. The answer
to those objections would be that a mortgagor who is not personally liable realizes the amount of the debt when he transfers the
property subject to the debt since he is thereby freed from a
liability. That liability is only to surrender the property and hence
does not exceed the value of the property. There would still 'be
left unanswered, however, the argument that a taxpayer who has
deducted depreciation from a basis which did not represent an
actual expenditure by him should be required to include the amount
of that depreciation in the "amount realized". That is the
"double deduction" argument of Crane v. Commissioner. Thus
such a statute would leave open the tax avoidance possibilities of
the Crane rule. A preferable approach, therefore, would seem to
be that suggested above: including only the equity in the mor'tgagor's basis and only any cash or property (apart from the debt)
received in the amount realized.
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Is there any way that a mortgagor whose equity is worth little
or nothing can avoid the result of the Crane case ? The opinion in
Crane v. Commissioner suggested that a taxpayer may avoid that
result by abandoning the property or transferring it subject to
the mortgage without receiving boot, at least if the amount of the
debt exceeds the value of the property.71 Those possibilities will
be dealt with in another section.
It has also been suggested that a mortgagor may avoid the result of the Crane case by transferring realty in which his equity
is worthless to a new corporation which has no other assets,.7 The
transfer should be made before the mortgagor has deducted such
depreciation as to adjust the basis of the transferred property to
an amount less than that of the debt, so that the tax-free character
of the exchange will not be important. 78 Then on foreclosure the
corporation may realize a capital gain, but will lack any assets
from which a tax could be collected. The stockholder will not be
liable for the tax as a transferee because it will have received no
valuable assets from the corporation.
The danger of this corporate device, as was admitted by those
suggesting it, is that the Commissioner may ignore the corporation and treat the gains as that of the stockholder. That result
seems highly probable if the corporation is used merely to hold
title to the realty. The cases have divided on whether a taxpayer
may for his own tax benefit disregard the entity of a corporation
which he had created primarily to hold title to property. 74 The
71. 331 U. S. 1, 14 n. 37 (1947).
72. Greenlee and Kramer, The Mortgagorwith a "Negative Basis", 27 TAXES 887,
890 (1949).
73, Under Section 351, a person may transfer property to a corporation without
recognition of gain if he makes the transfer solely for stock or securities of the corporation and immediately thereafter controls the corporation. If, however, the transfer
is not made for a bona fide business purpose, the taking of the property by the corporation subject to a liability of the transferor is treated as money received by the transferor
and any gain realized by him is recognized to the extent of the money received. Sections

351(b) and 357(b).

Query, whether Section 357(b) is applicable if the transferor had

held the property only subject to the debt, without personal liability. It should be
noted also that if the adjusted basis of the property transferred is less than the liabilities

to which the property was subject, the excess is treated as a gain from the sale or

exchange of the property, so that the gain will be capital gain if the asset was a capital
asset. Section 357(c).
74. The following cases permitted the taxpayer to disregard the corporate entity:
U. S. v. Brager Bldg. & Land Corp., 124 F. 2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941) ; North Jersey

Title Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F. 2d 898 (3d Cir. 1936) ; 112 West 59th St. Gorp.
v. Helvering, 68 F. 2d 397 (D. C. Cir. 1933) ; Carling Holding Co., 41 B. T. A.'493
(1940);
The following cases reached a contrary result: Palcar Real Estate Co. v. Conmissioner, 131 F. 2d 210 (8th Cir. 1942).; Salnon v. Commissioner, 126 F. 2d 203 (2d
Cir. 1942) ; Sheldon Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 118 F. Zd 835 (7th Cir. 1941). -
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matter is complicated by the fact that in some of the cases a
showing could be made that the corporation had some business
purpose other than merely holding title. It seems highly probable, in any case, that the Commissioner could successfully dis.
regard a corporate entity created only for the purpose of avoiding
taxes. The Supreme Court in Higgins v. Smith,75 said:
. . . [T]he Government may not be required to acquiesce in
the taxpayer's election of that form for doing business which is
most advantageous to him. The Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for

doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal
or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as
best serves the purposes of the tax statute. To hold otherwise
would permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede legislation
in the determination of the time and manner of taxation. It is
command of income and its benefits which marks the real owner
of property.
In Moline Properties,Inc. v. Commissioner,8 the Supreme Court
refused to permit a taxpayer to disregard a corporation but said:
"In general, in matters relating to the revenue, the corporate
form may be disregarded where it is a sham or unreal. In such
situations the form is a bald and mischievous fiction."
Perhaps the suggested device would be upheld if the corporation actively managed the property. The problem then would be
whether the Commissioner could successfully penetrate the dis77
guise by using the argument, based on Gregory v. Helvering,
that the arrangement had no business purpose. The doctrine of
that case has been referred to in situations far afield from its
origin in a question of whether there had been a re-organization. 78
In short, this corporate device seems unlikely to succeed.
A question may also arise as to whether the corporate device
would be successful in the face of Section 269. Probably that section would not be relevant, since the purpose of the corporation
would be not to secure the benefit of a "deduction, credit, or other
allowance" but to avoid taxation on a gain.
Another possibility would be giving the property to a charity.T
On such a transfer the mortgagor would probably not be held to
0 are disrealize any taxable gain. Cases like Helvering v. Horst8
tinguishable on the ground that they involve transfers just of a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

308 U. S. 473. at 477 (1940).
319 U. S. 436 (1943).
293 U. S. 465 (1935).
As in Higgbzs v. Smiih, 308 U.- S. 473, 476 (1940).
Note, 22 TULANFE L. Pv. 218, 219 (1947).
311 U. S. 112 (1940).
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segment of the periodic income arising from particular property
and separated from that property, whereas here the mortgagor
would be transferring the basic property itself, the tree as well
as any fruit concealed in its branches. On the other hand, it
might be argued that although unrealized appreciation of the
market value of donated assets is not taxable to the donor, he
should not be able to avoid the taxation of a gain attributable to
depreciation deducted by him.
If successful this device not only should enable the mortgagor
to avoid being taxed on a gain but also should give him a deduction for the charitable gift. Normally that deduction would be of
the fair market value of the property, subject to the percentage
limitations imposed on deduction of charitable gifts by Section
170(b).
The suggestion has been made that here the deduction should
be of only the donor's equity. 81 Such an idea appeals to our sense
of justice, since the value of the property in excess of the equity
reflects no investment by the donor. On the other hand, we normally let a donor deduct the fair market value of the property,
although that may include appreciation due to outside factors.
Perhaps then the donor in the suggested case should be permitted
a deduction of the full value of the property, since such a procedure would be not much less rational than our usual rules for
deduction of charitable gifts.
EFFECT OF FORECLOSURE ONT THE TAX LIABILITY OF A MORTGAGOR

If the mortgagor does not transfer its interest when paying the
debt appears hopeless' or unwise but instead suffers foreclosure,
the sale is treated as a sale for the purpose of determining its tax
liability. More specifically, the transaction is a "sale or exchange" under Section 1222, dealing with capital gains and losses.,,
There was, some theoretical difficulty in reaching this result, because it was not consistent with the traditional concept of a Sale.
The argument was that the mortgagor was not a party to the
transaction, did not assent to it and did not receive any consideration if he was not personally liable on the debt and the bid price
did not exceed the total interest of the mortgagee. It was also
81.-Note, 22-TULANE L. Rnv. 218, 219 (1947).
"
82. Helvering v Hammel, 311 U. S. 504 (1941). That conclusion was reached
after considerable litigation. Among the earlier cases reaching a contrary result were:
-

Sol Greisler, 102 F. 2d 787 (3d Cir. 1939) afflrming 37 B. T. A. 542 (1938); Lloyd

Jones, 39 B. T. A. 531' (1939; H. L' Rust, Jr., 38 B. T. A. 910 (1938), appeal dismissed

without opinion 105 F. 2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1939); C. Griffith Warfield, 38 B."T. A.
. I

907 (1938).
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argued that the transaction effected merely a partial payment of
a debt of the mortgagor, and that payment of a debt does not
constitute a sale or exchange."' Taxpayers contended that Congress had sought, by limiting the deductibility of capital losses,
only to prevent fluctuations in revenue caused by voluntary sales
of capital assets.8 4 In Helvering v. Hammel, 5 however, the Supreme Court took the position that the statutory language relating to sales should not be restricted to voluntary sales unless the
lack of such a restriction would lead to an absurd result or thwart
the purpose of the statute. The court also argued that Congress
must have intended to treat foreclosure sales as "sales" since
it had not adopted a specific statement to the effect that they
should be treated as sales, as it had done for other involuntary
transactions, such as the retirement of bonds.8 8'
It was held then that a foreclosure is a sale, for the purposes
of determining the tax liabilities of the mortgagor, regardless of
whether he had been personally liable on the debt. 7 The result
is probably sound and not such a departure from traditional ideas
of property law as might at first be supposed. A foreclosure sale
deprives the mortgagor of all his interest in the property, if he
does not redeem.8" The difficult theoretical question is whether
the mortgagor can be said to have received any consideration,
which is thought to be an essential element of a sale. The answer
seems to be that release from a debt which is enforceable only
against the mortgaged property is consideration.8 9 That would
follow from the holding of Crane v. Commissioner that the debt
83. Lloyd Jones, 39 B. T. A. 531, 536 (1939).
84. Sol Greisler, 102 F. 2d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 1939).
85. 311 U. S. 504 (1941).
86. Int. Rev. Code §117(f) (1939).
These are striking reversals of -the old
interpretative maxims of expressio unius and of the interpretation of ambiguous tax statutes in favor of the taxpayer.

For a classic statement of the latter maxim, see Gould

v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153 (1917).

There seems today to be little hope for the tax-

payer whose case rests largely on the latter maxim.

Note the following language from

White v. U. S., 305 U. S. 281, 292 (1938):
We are not impressed by the argument that, as the question here decided is doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. It is the function and
duty of courts to resolve doubts. We know of no reason why that function should
be abdicated in a tax case more than in any other where the rights of suitors
turn on the construction of a statute and it is our duty to decide what that construction fairly should be.
87. Commissioner v. Abrahamson, 124 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Welch v. Street,
116 F. 2d 953 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Jacob Abelson, 44 B. T. A. 98 (1941) ; Edward F. C.
McLaughlin, 43 B. T. A. 528 (1941) ; Bessie W. Trinble, P-H 1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec.
Par. 41, 367; William N. Bartlett, P-H 1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par. 41, 336; Byron
T. Shutz and Maxine C. Shutz, P-H 1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par. 41, 324; Carrie
Roth Saneth, P-H 1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par. 41, 189; Lizzie W. Hill, P-H 1941
B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par. 41. 144.
88. Note, 54 HAav. L. REv. 880 (1941).
89. Fritz L. Braunfeld, Subject to a Mortgage, 24 TAXEs 424, 438-9 (1946).
Mr. Braunfeld puts this in terms of release from liability to yield the property.
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is part of the amount realized by a mortgagor who sells property
subject to a mortgage. As a practical matter reaching the same
tax result in the case of a foreclosure sale as in a voluntary sale
by the mortgagor to a third person is desirable. The form of the
transaction by which a taxpayer disposes of his property should
affect the amount of his taxes as little as possible.
Before the 1942 Revenue Act revised Section 117 of the 1939
Code 90 so as to treat most deductible losses on the sale of realty
as ordinary, mortgagors were concerned to establish that they
had not sold or exchanged their property. Helvering v. Hammel
and the related cases defeated that effort in respect of foreclosure
sales. Since the adoption of the 1942 Act, the mortgagor has been
more often concerned with the problems of whether he would be
treated as having realized a taxable gain on foreclosure and
whether that gain was capital or ordinary. Mendham Corporation, 91 is interesting as an illustration of the pressure that the
calculation of basis for purposes of depreciation without subtraction of liens, creates toward a holding that the mortgagor
realizes taxable gain on any non-donative disposition of the property. The mortgagor had received the property in a tax-free exchange, so that it used the basis of the transferor. It was not
personally liable on the debt, but the Tax Court held that the
amount of the debt was includible in the "amount realized", and
that the mortgagor had realized taxable gain on the foreclosure
on the ground that a contrary result would fail to take account of
depreciation deducted by the transferor and so facilitate avoidance of the tax.2
A mortgagor may still be concernedwith the problem of whether
his property is a capital asset. It is now desirable for him to
have it considered as used in his trade or business so that any
gain will be capital and any loss ordinary. Thus he will contend
that rental property was used in his trade or business. There is
authority to that effect.9 3 A problem has arisen as to whether
property is used in the taxpayer's trade or business if it considers
putting the property to use but decides not to do so and sells it.
The Tax Court has held that when a taxpayer bought vacant land
for the erection of a warehouse to be used in conjunction with its
tobacco business but later changed its plans and sold the land,
90. Now Section 1231 of the 1954 Code.
91. 9 T. C. 320 (1947).
92. The following cases also held that mortgagors realized taxable gains on foreclosure sales: R. O'Dell & Sons Co. Inc. v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir.
1948), affirming 8 T. C. 1165 (1947) ; Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198
F. 2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952), affirming 16 T. C. No. 80 (1951); 1180 E. 63rd St. Bldg.
Corp. 12 T. C. 437 (1949).
93. John E. Good, 16 T. C. 906 (1951) ; Win. H. Jamison, 8 T. C. 173 (1947).
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the land had been used in the trade or business and the loss on
its sale was ordinary. 4 In the case, however, of property held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade
or business both gains and losses still are ordinary 5 'Whether
such a classification will be undesirable then will depend on
whether a gain or a loss is realized on foreclosure. The cases
holding that the amount of the debt is part of the basis and of the
amount realized should be kept in mind in the determination of
whether there is a gain or a loss.
WHEN THE TAx CoNSEQUENcES OF A FoREcLosURE ARF FmD-THE MORTGAGOR

The next problem relates to the time when the mortgagor shall
be held to have realized gain or loss in connection with a foreclosure sale. The applicable principle is that stated by the regulations dealing with losses generally:
"In general losses for which an amount may be deducted from
gross income must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events, bona fide and actually sustained during the taxable period for which allowed. 9 6
When is a foreclosure a sufficiently closed and completed transaction for this purpose ? Tax consequences do not arise upon the
issuance of a decree of foreclosure but upon some later event. 7
One of the few cases dealing with realization of gain by a mortgagor on foreclosure held that a gain, measured by the excess of
the obligation discharged over the mortgagor's adjusted basis,
was realized in the year in which an action for a deficiency judgment became barred and the right of redemption cut off. 98 More
commonly the cases have dealt with the time of realization of loss.
The cases have held generally that if there is a period after the
foreclosure sale during which the mortgagor can redeem the
property, he does not realize a loss until the expiration of that
period.9 It has been held, however, that a mortgagor could de94. Graves Brothers Co., 17 T. C. 1499 (1952) ; Carter-Colton Cigar Co., 9 T. C.
219 (1947).
95. See Charles H. Black, 45 B. T. A. 204 (1941), which held that the mortgagor
had held land primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business and had realized an ordinary loss on foreclosure.
96. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(e)-l(b) (1953).
97. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504 (1941).
98. R. O'Dell & Sons Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948),
affrming 8 T. C. 1165 (1947).
99. Commissioner v. Hawkins, 91 F. 2d 354 (5th Cir. 1937), afrning 34 B. T. A.
918 (1936) ; Shelden Land Co., 42 B. T. A. 498 (1940) ; Derby Realty Corp., 35 B. T.
A. 335 (1937) ; James E. Maxwell, P-H 1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par. 41, 051; George

Verplanck, P-H 1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par. 41, 045; G. C. M. 19367, 1937-2 Cum.
BuLL. 115.
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duct his loss in the year of the foreclosure sale, when it appeared
that the value of the property was substantially less than the redemption price and the mortgagors decided not to redeem the
property. 0 0 The reason for the general rule seems to be that
while the mortgagor has a right to redeem there has been no completed transaction giving rise to a loss. Also, the mortgagor may
under local statutes have possession and legal title until the redemption period has expired.
EFFECT OF FoREcLosuRE ON THE TAx L

iBiLITY OF A MORTGAGEE

The mortgagee too may realize a deductible loss on foreclosure.
If the property is bid in for less than the amount of the debt and
the excess is uncollectible, the mortgagee may treat the excess as
a bad debt deductible under Section 166.101 The excess may be
treated as uncollectible at the time of the foreclosure sale, if the
mortgagor then has no other assets from which it can be collected. 02 Otherwise the excess may not be deducted as of that time
because the foreclosure alone does not conclusively establish the
uncollectibility of the debt. 0 3 The excess does, however, become
uncollectible for this purpose when the period for getting a deficiency judgment has expired. 4
When the period for redemption has expired a mortgagee who
bid in the property may also deduct a loss to the extent that the
fair market value of the property is less than the amount of the
obligations of the debtor representing capital or interest taxed
to the mortgagee, bid in on the property.' ° Several difficulties
lie in the way of allowance of the loss. Usually no loss is realized
on the purchase of property. 0 6 Here, however, the mortgagee
may be said not merely to have purchased property but to have
exchanged obligations of the debtor for the property. An ex100. Jacob Abelson, 44 B. T. A. 98 (1941).
101. Doris D. Havemeyer, 45 B. T. A. 329 (1941); William C. Heinemann & Co.,
40 B. T. A. 1090 (1939); Henry N. Brawner Estate, 36 B. T. A. 884 (1937); U. S.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k) -3 (1953) ; G. C. M. 19573, 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
102. William C. Heinemann & Co., 40 B. T. A. 1090 (1939).
103. Arthur Berenson, 39 B. T. A. 77 (1939), affirmed without opinion, 113 F. 2d
113 (2d Cir. 1940).

104. G. C. M. 19573. 1938-1 Ctum. Bull. 214.
The older cases also raised questions as to when the mortgagee had sufficiently
ascertained the debt and charged it off. Malden Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d

751 (1st Cir. 1940), afflrning 39 B. T. A. 190 (1939) ; Brouvn v. U. S., 95 F. 2d 487
(3d Cir. 1938), reversing 19 F. Supp. 825 (E. D. Penn. 1937); since the revision of
by the 1942 Revenue Act, such questions have not arisen. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 3923(k)-i (1953).
105. Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. U. S., 110 F. 2d 887 (1st Cir. 1940). See Malden
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 751 (1st Cir. 1940), affirming 39 B. T. A. 190

§ 23(k)

(1939) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(k)-3 (1953) ; I. T. 3121, 1937-2 Cul. BuLl..
138; I. T. 3159, 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 188; G. C. M. 19573, 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
106. Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 63, 69 (1937).
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change may give rise to a deductible loss. Also, under the holding in Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co., °7 it was
awkward to acknowledge for tax purposes the fact that the fair
market value of the property might be less than the face amount
of the obligations bid for it. That case was distinguished on the
ground that it had not dealt with Section 29.23 (k)-3 of Regulations 111.1°8 Repeated re-enactment of the statute was held to
give that regulation the force of law.10 9 Perhaps another factor
was simple antagonism for the result of the Midland Mutual case.
The Midland Mutual case held that if a mortgagee who is on
the cash basis buys the mortgaged property at the foreclosure
sale, on a bid equal to the sum of the principal debt and the accrued interest, it realizes taxable income to the extent of the accrued interest. The taxpayer had offered evidence to the effect that
the fair market value of the property was less than the amount
of the debt, but the Board of Tax Appeals considered that point
immaterial and therefore made no finding of fact in respect to it.
The arguments adopted by the Supreme Court were as follows:
1. The statute taxing "interest" received by insurance companies spoke broadly and should be so construed. Or we might say
that ambiguous tax statutes are to be construed against taxpayers
0
contrary to the earlier approach of Gould v. Gould."1
2. Theoretically the purchase at a bid equalling principal and
interest paid and discharged the debt giving the mortgagor a de.
duction for interest paid and resulting in taxable income to the
mortgagee.
Assuming that the purchase discharged the debt, it did not
necessarily follow that the debtor should be treated for tax purposes as having paid the debt or the creditor as having received
it. The problem is really one of policy.
3. The taxpayer considered the protection of a high redemption
price worth the discharge of the interest debt.
4. Administration of the tax law would be burdened unduly by
taking account of the fair market value of the property.
This argument was weakened, if not defeated, by the fact that
the Treasury Department itself in Section 29.23(k)-3 of Regulations Ill had provided for consideration of fair market value in
107. 300 U. S. 216 (1937).

108. Now § 39.23(k)-3 of Regulations 118.
109. Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. U. S., 110 F. 2d 887, 891, 892, (1st Cir. 1940).
110. 245 U. S. 151, 153 (1917).
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the determination of the tax liabilities of a mortgagee who bid in
property at a foreclosure sale.'1 1
5. The taxpayer itself voluntarily made its bid and by its practice of bidding principal and interest may have deterred others
from making bids which would have paid at least part of the interest.
As Justice McReynolds said in his dissenting opinion in the
Midland Mutual case, "Like imaginary 'receipts' of interest often
12
repeated and similarly burdened would hasten bankruptcy.'
Although there is no conclusive subsequent case, Justice McReynolds' view seems likely to prevail in the future. The Eighth Cirearlier adopted the approach of the Midland Mutual
cuit 1had
13
case.

The Midland Mutual case was followed by the Board of Tax
Appeals." 4 The Sixth Circuit, however, refused to follow the
Midland Muztual case where the taxpayer was not an insurance
company." 5 It distinguished that case chiefly on the ground that
it had dealt with an insurance company, to the transactions of
which Section 29.23(k)-3 of Regulations 111 was inapplicable.
The Nichols case indicates that at least in the Sixth Circuit a mortgagee other than an insurance company need not fear the result
of the Midland Mutual case. The difficulty is that insurance companies invest heavily in mortgages. If we have another depression and widespread foreclosure of mortgages, the Midland Mutual
case may cause headaches. The writer's understanding is, however, that in periods of depression when redemption is unlikely to
occur insurance companies do not include unpaid interest in the bid
price.
Even if the Midland Mutual case is not followed, a mortgagee
bidding in property at a foreclosure sale may realize taxable income if the fair market value of the property exceeds the mortgagee's basis for the obligations credited against his bid. 10
111. Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. U. S., 110 F. 2d 887, 892 (1st Cir. 1940).
112. At page 227.

113. Helvering v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 78 F. 2d 778 (8th Cir. 1934),
reversing 29 B. T. A. 401 (1933).
114. Clarkson Coal Co., 46 B. T. A. 688 (1942); T. Eugene Piper, 45 B. T. A.
280 (1941).
115. Nichols v. Co,nmissioner, 141 F. 2d 870 (6th Cir. 1944), reversing 1 T. C.
328 (1942).
116. Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 853 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied 332
U. S. 817 (1947) ; Commissioner v. West Production Co., 121 F. 2d 9 (5th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied 314 U. S. 682 (1941); Aaron W. Hardwick, P-H 1947 T. C. Mem. Dec.
Par. 47,060.
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If the Midland Mutual case stands, a cash basis mortgagor
may deduct the interest which under that case is taxed to the mortgagee." 7 Thus the unreality of that case is further demonstrated.
PAYMENTS BY A MOSTGAGOR AFTER FoREcLosuRE

Even after foreclosure of a mortgage and expiration of the
right of redemption, transactions relating to the debt may have
tax consequences for the mortgagor or mortgagee. If the mortgagor pays additional amounts to discharge his liability on the
debt, he may deduct those amounts as losses, capital or ordinary,
according to whether the mortgaged property had been a capital
asset in his hands since such payments are treated as additional
payments toward the price of the mortgaged property.:" Such
payments would reduce the loss or bad debt deduction of the mortgagee, or constitute income to him if he had already deducted such
a loss.
PossrBiLiTY oF ABANDONMENT

AND ITS ADVANTAGES

We have seen above that a mortgagor may suffer only a
capital loss, if any, on a foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property."n9 Worse yet, he is held to realize the amount of the debt if
he transfers the property to a third person for a small cash consideration subject to the mortgage. 2 0 Can the mortgagor avoid
those results by claiming a loss in the year when his equity becomes worthless, without any transfer, voluntary or involuntary?
Such a 'loss would be ordinary for lack of the "sale or exchange"
requisite for realization of a capital gain or loss under Section
1222.
The mortgagor has a chance of success if he was not personally liable on the debt and can prove that his interest was worth21
less, and that he did abandon control over the land and its rents.'
The argument supporting the result of the cases so holding is that
117. See Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co., 300 U. S. 216, 224
(1937) ; Harold M. Blossom, 38 B. T. A. 1136 (1938).
118. Charles H. Black, 45 B. T. A. 204 (1941); Harry H. Diamond, 43 B. T. A.

809 (1941).
119. If the property was neither held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business nor used in his trade or business.
INT. RE:v. Coon §§ 1221 and 1231 (1954).
120. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1 (1947).
121. Bickerstaff v. Commissioner, 128 F. 2d 366 (5th Cir. 1942), reversing 44
B. T. A. 457 (1941); Commissioner v. Hoffman, 117 F. 2d 987 (2d Cir. 1941), affirming 40 B. T. A. 459 (1939); Rhodes v. Commissioner, 100 F. 2d 966 (6th Cir. 1939),
reversing 34 B. T. A. 212 (1936); Denmnan v. Brumback, 58 F. 2d 128 (6th Cir. 1932),
afflrming 48 F. 2d 255 (N. D. Ohio 1930) ; Morton L. Kahn, 44 B. T. A. 84 (1941) ;

Realty Operators, Inc., 40 B. T. A. 1051 (1939), petition for review dismissed, 118 F.
2d 286 (5th Cir. 1941).
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the test of when a loss has been sustained is practical rather than
legal.'2 2 That argument was opposed by the view that title to real
property cannot be lost by abandonment, unlike title to personal
property, and that therefore, there is no transaction sufficiently
closed for the ascertainment of a loss until the mortgagor has formally conveyed his interest to another.' 3
It has also been held that the mortgagor could not claim an
ordinary loss on abandonment of the mortgaged property if he
was personally liable on the debt, on the ground that the property
continued to have some value until a foreclosure sale cut off the
mortgagor's interest and determined his liability for a deficiency
judgment. 24 That argument apparently is not that the mortgagor's interest continued to have a fair market value but that
the extent of his loss could not be ascertained at least until after
the foreclosure sale since a deficiency judgment might be obtained
against him. A similar result has been reached in the case of a
mortgagee who was not personally liable but who had failed to
prove the
value of the property or his abandonment of control
25
over it.
As against the reasoning of the Green case that the amount
of the loss of a mortgagor who was personally liable cannot be
ascertained until the foreclosure sale and entry of a deficiency
judgment or passing of the time for obtaining such a judgment, it
has been argued that the loss can be ascertained by comparing the
basis of the mortgagor with the fair market value of the property
at the time of the purported abandonment. 2 ' It has been contended that the determination of fair market value for that purpose is not administratively wasteful since it must be determined
for the purpose of ascertaining the bad debt deduction of the mortgagee and his subsequent basis. That contention appears to be
based on the assumption that the tax liability of the mortgagee
will be fixed as of the time of the purported abandonment. That
would be the case if the abandonment was effected by a formal conveyiance from the mortgagor to the mortgagee. It might be the
case if the abandonment amounted only to a relinquishment by
the mortgagor of control over the property, with foreclosure occurring later, if the abandonment were treated as the event which
substantially changed the positions of both parties. If, however,
122. Lucas v. American Code Co., Inc., 280 U. S. 445, 449 (1930).
123. Greenleaf Textile Corp., 26 B. T. A. 737 (1932), afflrmed mem., 65 F. 2d
1017 (2d Cir. 1933) ; H. M. N. Muhle, 19 B. T. A. 1247 (1930) ; Consolidated Brick Co.,
17 B. T. A. 831 (1929) ; A. J. Schwaraler Co., 3 B. T. A. 535 (1926) ; this argument
seems to be supported by 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRopmRTY, 28 (3d edition, 1939).
124. Commissioner v. Green, 126 F. 2d 70 (3rd Cir. 1941).
125. Commissioner v. -Abramson,124 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir., 1942).
126. Fritz L. Braunfeld, Subject to a Mortgage, 24 TAXES 424, at 440 (1946).
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the foreclosure were treated as the event fixing the tax liabilities
of the mortgagee, the fair market value of the property might
change between the time of the abandonment and the time of the
foreclosure. Also in that case, fair market value would be relevant
in determining whether the mortgagee realized a gain or a loss if
he became the purchaser, but not relevant to the determination of
whether he had a bad debt deduction. 27
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE BY THE MORTGAGOR TO THE MORTGAGEE

Can the mortgagor achieve favorable tax results by voluntarily conveying the mortgaged property to the mortgagee? In
the cases of roughly fifteen years back, mortgagors argued that
their transfers to mortgagees were not sales or exchanges and
that therefore they had realized ordinary losses thereon. A number of cases held that such a transaction effected by a mortgagor
who was not personally liable on the debt was not a sale or exchange and therefore resulted in an ordinary loss if any. 12 The
suggestion has been made that the explanation of these cases lies
in a desire to reach the same result as in the cases of foreclosure,
which was before Hetvering v. JHammel,129 generally thought not
30
to involve a sale or-exchange of property of the mortgagor.
A number of other cases dealing with such transfers by mortgagors who were personally liable either for the mortgage debt
or for taxes, in consideration of release from the debt or payment
of the taxes, have held that the mortgagor realized only a capital
loss. 13 1 The release from liability or payment of taxes is the con127. U, S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(k)-3 (1953).
Mr. Braunfeld did not contend so much that the Green case had been decided
wrongly as that it showed the difficulties which arise because the courts over-emphasii'e
the difference between assumption and non-assumption of personal liability.
128. Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F. 2d 335 (3rd Cir. 1941) ; Polin v. Commissiozer,
114 F. 2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940) ; Win. H. Jamison, 8 T. C. 173 (1947) (Conveyance to
taxing unit) ; James B. Lapsley, 44 B. T. A. 1105 (1941) ; Bert B. Bernquisl, 44'B. T. A.
484 (1941) ; Warner G. Baird, 42 B. T. A. 970, 43 B. XT. A. 415 (1940) ; Commonwealth,
Inc., 36 B. T. A. 850 (1937); Walter F. Haass Estate, P-H 1942 B. T. A. and T. C.
Mem. Dec. Par. 42, 118 (quitclaim deed to a vendor under a'la nd contract) ;. Canden
Stores, Inc., P-H 1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par. 41, 414.
129. 311 U. S. 504 (1941).
130. Fritz L. Braunfeld, Subject to a Mortgage, 24 Taxes 424, 436 (1946).
131. Stanler v. Commissioner, 145 F. 2d 37 (3d Cir. 1944); Burger-Phillips Co.
v. Commissioner, 126 F. 2d 934 (5th Cir. 1942) (land contract); Richter v. Commissioner, 124 F. 2d 412 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Aberle v. Commissioner, 121 F. 2d 726 (3d Cir.
1941-) ; Day Estate v; Commissioner, 117 F. 2d 208 (7th Cir. 1941) ; C. L. Gransden-&
Co., 117 F. 2d 80 (6th Cir. 1941) (land contract) ; Wieboldt v. Comiissioner, 113 F. 2d
384 (7th Cir. 1940); Philips v. Coinmissioner, 112 F. 2d 721 (3rd. Cir. 1940) ; Pender
v. Cominissioner, 110 F. 2d 477 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, -310 U. S. 650- (1950);
Rogers v. Commissioner, 103 F. 2d 790 -(9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 580
(1939) ; Harold R. Smith, 39 B. T. A. 892 (1939) -(lafid contract) ;:Stanley Fiit Co.,
P-H 1-941 B: T. A. M&m. Dec..-Pbr. 41,.079; Henry J.- Lange"and Julia C. Lange, P-H
1941 B. T. A. Mem. Dec. Par 41. 043.
..
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sideration which enables the transaction to be treated as a sale
or exchange.
A problem has arisen where the mortgagor was not personally liable on the debt and therefore did not receive any release
from liability which could be treated as consideration but the mortgagee paid or promised some relatively small pecuniary consideration for the transfer. Nominal consideration recited in the
deed but not paid has been ignored.' 82 So has consideration of
fifty dollars recited to have been given for the deed but really
meant to cover costs of the transfer and payment for personal
property left on the premises. 33 A similar result was reached
when a mortgagor quitclaimed his interest to his co-mortgagor by
a deed reciting consideration of one dollar which was neither paid
nor meant to be paid. 34 On the other hand, payment of a fee of
$250 to the mortgagor's lawyer by the mortgagee has been held
to make the transfer a sale, although the mortgagor had been
willing to give the property away. 5
The nature of the argument seems to be shifting. In the
earlier cases, a mortgagor who had transferred the property to the
mortgagee was thought to realize a loss of his equity; hence he
was concerned to argue that the transaction was not a sale or exchange and that, therefore, his loss was ordinary. Now that losses
on the sale or exchange of land used in the trade or business are
ordinary, mortgagors are less often eager to establish that a voluntary transfer to the mortgagee was not a sale. Furthermore,
the tendency now seems to be to hold that on such a transfer the
mortgagor realizes the amount of the debt; hence it is to the interest of the mortgagor to argue that the transaction was a sale
or exchange and that he realized only a capital gain. The First
Circuit has held that if a mortgagor, not personally liable for the
debt, conveys the property to the mortgagee, he thereupon realizes the amount of the debt.136 The. result was based largely on the
Crane case with reference to the fact that the mortgagor had deducted depreciation calculated on a basis which included the
amount of the debt. As in the Crane case, the court left open the
possibility that the result would be different if the value of the
property were proved to be less than the amount of the debt and
the mortgagor received no boot. 8 7 The court based its decision
132. Win. H. Jami.son, 8 T. C. 173 (1947).
133. Commonwealth, Inc.; 36 B. T. A. 850 (1937).
134. Park Chamberlain,41 B. T. A. 10 (1940).

135. Blum v. Commissioner, 133 F. 2d 447 (2d Cir. 1943).
136. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F. 2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
137. Crane v., Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 14 (footnote 37) (1947); Parker v.
Delaney, 186 F. Zd 455, 458 (1st Cir. 1950).
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on the ground that the transfer was a "disposition" for purposes
of Section 111 of the 1939 Code, so that gain or loss might be realized. Whether it was also a "sale or exchange" for purposes of
Section 117 of the 1939 Code was not in issue.
A tax result somewhat similar to that just discussed was arrived at in Lutz & Schramm Co. on a different basis. 3 8 The taxpayer-mortgagor had apparently borrowed money and given a
mortgage on real property -as security. It became free of personal
liability on the debt in 1934. Then in 1937 it transferred the property to the creditor in discharge of the debt whch was greater in
amount than the adjusted basis of the property. The Tax Court
held that the taxpayer had realized gain in 1937 from the disposition of the property since it had received the benefit
39 of the loan
and had discharged it for less than the full amount.
Starting with Crane and Parkerv. Delaney as a basis for prediction, it appears probable that a mortgagor who is not personally liable for the debt and who transfers the mortgaged property to the mortgagee will ultimately be held not only to have
realized the amount of the debt but to have made a sale or exchange, so that he will not realize a deductible loss if the amount
40
of the debt exceeds his basis but will realize a capital gain.1 If
under Cranethe mortgagor realizes the amount of the debt, because
he has become free from the practical necessity of treating the debt
as his own or losing the property, when he transfers the property
to a third party, the same result should apply when he transfers it
to the mortgagee. Parker v. Delaney so holds. Further, if he
realizes the amount of the debt for the purpose of determining the
amount of his gain or loss, he must also realize it for the purpose
of deciding whether he has received consideration for the transfer and hence has made a sale or exchange, so that his gain or loss
is capital. 14' His basis for the determination of the amount of his
gain or loss presumably will include the amount4 2of the debt-if it
is to be treated as part of the amount realized.
,. The results suggested here are desirable also so that the tax
consequences of a voluntary conveyance to the mortgagee will be
138. 1 T. C. 682 (1943).
139. Apparently the Tax Court has refused to follow Lutz & Schramm, where
the debt was incurred in connection with the purchase of the -property pledged" as
security. Charles L. Nutter, 7 T. C. 480 (1946).
140. This assumes that the property is a capital asset or that § 1231 applies.
141. Note, 49 CoL. L. REv. 845, 850 n. 40 (1949).
142. Blackston Theatre Co., 12 T. C. 801 (1949). Before. the decision of the
Crane case and the tendency to include the amount of the debt in the amount realized,'.it
was, thought that the basis of a mortgagor who was not personally liable on thd debt
was merely the coat of -his equity. Note, .46 CoL. L. -REV.486,.487. (1946).-:
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the same as those of a foreclosure. Then the choice between suffering foreclosure or making a voluntary transfer will be motivated by business reasons, such as a judgment as to whether a
foreclosure sale might result in a realization of more than
4 3 the
amount of the debt, rather than a desire to minimize taxes.
MORTGAGEE'S ACCEPTANCE OF VOLUNTARY TRANSFER
MORTGAGOR

FROm

The problem then arises as to the tax consequences to a mortgagee of his acceptance of a voluntary conveyance of the mortgaged
property in satisfaction of the debt. If the property is worth less
than the mortgagee's basis for the obligation discharged, the mortgagee is generally held to realize a deductible bad debt to the extent of the difference. 44 There is some authority that the loss is
not a bad debt but a loss. 45 Presumably the deduction of such a
loss is subject to the limitations relating to capital losses.
The arguments for allowing the deduction as a bad debt are:
1. If the mortgagor had sold the property to a third party and
paid the proceeds to the mortgagee, the transaction would have
been a payment of a debt as far as the mortgagee was concerned,
rather than a sale.
2. The average business man would interpret the transaction as
resulting in a bad debt.
The contrary argument is that there is not a bad debt deduction because the transaction extinguishes the debt. This latter argument is overly theoretical.
Instead of a loss, the transaction may result in the realization of a gain to the mortgagee.'46 If the value of the property exceeds the principal of the debt, the excess is treated as interest if
is an insurance company, not taxable on gains genthe mortgagee
47
erally.
143. Fritz L. Braunfeld, Subject to a Mortgage, 24 TAXES 424, 435 (1946).

144. Commissioner v. Spreckels, 120 F. 2d 517 (9th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v.
Nat'l. Bank of Commerce of San Antonio, Texas, 112 F. 2d 946 (5th Cir. 1940), affirming 40 B. T. A. 471 (1939) ; Bingham v. Commissioner, 105 F. 2d 971 (2d Cir. 1939);
I. T. 3548, 1942-1 Cum., BuLL. 74.
145. Bowles Lunch, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 235 (Ct. CI. 1940).
146. Henry .Heldt,.16 B. T. A. 1035 (.1929).:"
147. See Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. 2d 778 (8th Cir. 1934),
reversing 29 B. T. A. 401 (1933) ; Mafiufacturers Life Ins. Co., 4 T. C. 811 (1945) ;
Manufacturers Life Ins. Co,; 43 B. T. A. 867 (1941); See Manhattan Mutual Life fin.
Co"-; 37 B. -T..A,'1041:.(1938). The Midland Mutual case has been distinguished here

because of the lac& of a -bid-; Manufacturers Life Ins. Ca., 4 T: C. 811, 819 (1945).

FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
If a mortgagee acquires full title to the mortgaged property
from the mortgagor it must determine its basis for the future calculation of depreciation and gain or loss. If for example, it buys
of the
the property at a foreclosure sale, the fair market1 4value
8 A similar
basis.
its
property as of the time of the sale becomes
rule applies as to basis if the mortgagee accepts a voluntary
49
conveyance from the mortgagor in settlement of the debt. .
SETTLEMENT OF DEBT AT DISCOUNT BY TRANSFER OF PROPERTY OTHER
THAN MVIORTGAGEID REALTY

If a mortgagor satisfies the debt by transferring to the creditor property other than the mortgaged property, he thereby
realizes taxable income if he is solvent and the basis of the property is less than the amount of the debt, assuming that the. doctrine.
relating to the reduction of the purchase price is not applied.'5 0
This is now subject to the election, offered by Section 108, to exclude the income realized and to reduce the basis of the taxpayer's
property. If, however, the mortgagor was insolvent, he would
have realized no income. 5' .The theory is that by discharge of a
debt guch a taxpayer realizes no change in his -eco.ibic position.
A related problem arose ivhen a mortgagor paid a sum to the
mortgagee for release from personal liability without satisfaction of the debt.15 2 The Board of Tax Appeals held that the
amount of the payments was a deductible loss, not part. of _the,co.st
of thd property, since lhe mortgagor acquired no further in~terest
the property through his making the payment.
in.
Settlement of a mortgage debt- without transfer of the mortgaged property raises tax probleiis for tle mortgagee -too-.. The
transaction has been held not to be a sale or exchange ou-the part
iay-os--suffered-Vy the7--ff6n
of-th- m"tgam ee;-- -Theref ;
gagee is noV capital. Whe.th'er it is an ordinary loss or a bad -debt.
148. Marlborough Investment Co.. v. Com'missionii, 315 U. 'S. 189 (1942)'; .mes
.1. Reilly; 46-B.'-T. A1246 (1942).
149. I. T. 3548, 1942-1 Cum. -BULL. 74.
150. Dr. John Huberrnan, P-H 1943 T. C. Mei.Dec. Par. 43, 323. The following cases do not relate to mortgages but would be applicable authority, since the

problem is merely part of the general problem of satisfaction of a debt' with'pr6i erty
having a basis less than the amount of the debt:

J. L. McAlpine Land & Development

Co., Ltd., 126 F. 2d 163 (9th Cir. 1942), affirming 43 B. T. A. 520 (1941) ; Peninsula
Properties Co., Ltd., 47 B. T. A. 84 (1942); Carlisle Packing Co., 29 B. T. A. 514
(1933); E. F. Simms, 28 B. T. A. 988 (1933); Twin Ports Bridge Co., 27 B. T. A.

346 (1932) ; Hagan Corp., 21 B. T. A. 41 (1930).
151. Dallas Tranfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F. 2d 95
(5th Cir. 1934) ; Main Properties, Inc., 4 T. C. 364 (1944).
152. James Clarke Poole, P-H 1942 B. T. A. and T. C. Men. Dec. Par. 42, 156.
153. Hale v. Commissioner, 85 F. 2d 819 (D. C. Cir. 1936) ; James R. Stewart, 39
B. T. A. 87 (1939) ; I. T. 4018, 1950-2 Cum.Bum. 20.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
deduction is not clear. The Stewart case held it to be a bad debt
rather than a capital loss. I. T. 4018 he'ld it an ordinary loss
rather than a capital loss. The better answer seems to be that
the loss is a bad debt, since the mortgagee has not sold his interest
to a third party but has settled the debt with the mortgagor.04
Sometimes a mortgagee has accepted Home Owner's Loan
Corporation bonds in exchange for his release of the liability of
the mortgagor. The Board of Tax Appeals held first that the
mortgagee had exchanged one obligation for another'and therefore
had suffered only a capital loss.00 Later, without discussion of
the Bowen case, the Board held that the loss gave rise to a bad
debt deduction. 5 Theoretically, the earlier result seems to be
correct. As a practical matter, however, the HOLC bonds seem
to have been treated as the equivalent of cash. Hence the transaction might well be treated as a refunding of the debt by the mortgagor and payment of the original debt by him to the mortgagee.
CoNcLusI2

This study demonstrates principally the great extent to which
the owner of mortgaged property is treated as owing the debt
secured by the property, regardless of whether he is technically
liable for its payment. That appears in respect to the treatment
of interest payments, in the determination of the basis of such a
taxpayer and of the amount realized -by him on disposition of the
property, and probably will appear in the determination of
whether his disposition of the property is a sale or exchange. If
further evidence of the wisdom of looking to the tax consequences
of business transactions were needed, the fact of such treatment
should supply it.
If however the
154. Accord, Harold S. Denniston, 37 B. T. A. 834 (1938).
mortgagee is not a bank and the mortgage debt is evidenced by "securities", within the
meaning of Section .165(g),-the loss on the .worthlessness of those securities is capital:
Charles A. Morehead, How to Handle Foreclosures,Settlements between Mortgagor and
Mortgagee and Other-Mortgage'Dispaosition,6 N. Y. U. INSTIfUTE ON FE E AL. TAXA"
TfoN€ 399, 401 (1948).
.....
"
155. Josephine C. Bowen, 37 B. T. A. 412 (1938).
..156. Mary E. Wenger, 42 B.'T. A. 225 (1940), affirmed on other issues, 127 F.
Zd 523 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 646 (1942)."

